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1 Introduction
It is well known that when a ﬁrm and a labour union bargain over both wage and em-
ployment the resulting contract is Pareto eﬃcient (McDonald and Solow, 1981). However,
it is not well understood whether this eﬃciency property will be preserved if contracting
takes place amidst entry threats. Several authors have demonstrated that entry threats
can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the incumbent ﬁrm’s employment contracts (see, for example, De-
watripont, 1987, 1988; Ohnishi, 2001; Pal and Saha, 2006, 2008). But they have assumed
bargaining protocols which are inherently ineﬃcient (such as the right-to-manage bargain-
ing). In this paper we ask: Does the outcome of ‘eﬃcient bargaining’ remain eﬃcient under
entry threat, and does the agenda of bargaining (i.e. wage and employment both) help to
preserve eﬃciency?
We try to answer these questions in a simple model of entry, where the entrant does not
know the true marginal cost (MC) of the incumbent, and entry is proﬁtable only if the MC
is high. The incumbent ﬁrm-union pair can signal its true MC either by price alone, or by
both price and wage. The possibility of two alternative signalling mechanisms arises from
the fact that wage agreements may not be necessarily disclosed to outsiders. In the ﬁrst
case, because of limited avenue for information transmission, contracts are distorted. The
low cost type will be over-employed if it needs to separate itself through ‘limit pricing’. The
high cost type will also be over-employed, when it wants to mimic the low cost type. But in
the second case (signalling through both price and wage) as information revelation becomes
easier, separation of the types occurs even with ﬁrst best employment. So eﬃciency of
employment is unaﬀected by entry threats in a separating equilibrium. However, for apooling equilibrium the verdict is mixed. If the union’s bargaining power is below a critical
level, pooling equilibrium will not exist, an outcome eﬃcient indeed, reﬂecting the fact that
information suppression is harder, when both price and wage are observable. But if the
union is suﬃciently powerful, the ineﬃciency returns in the form of over-employment of
the high cost type.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the setup, subsequently in
Section 3 present the main analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 The setup
There is an incumbent ﬁrm (labelled ﬁrm 1), which negotiates both wage (w) and employ-
ment (l) with its labour union. There is also a potential entrant (ﬁrm 2) with marginal cost
c. The union supplies all workers to ﬁrm 1 and does not serve any other ﬁrm. Following
the Nash bargaining approach, we assume that the bargaining power of the union is given
by γ, (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) and conversely that of the ﬁrm by (1 − γ). The reservation payoﬀs of
the two bargaining parties are zero. Crucially, outside the wage and employment contract
no other payments, covert or overt, are made by the ﬁrm to the union or by the union to
the ﬁrm.
The production technology of ﬁrm 1 is assumed to be, for simplicity, x = l. The market
demand curve is linear: p = A − x. Thus, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is Π = (p − w)l. The union tries
to maximise its net wage bill U =( w−θ)l, where θ is the reservation wage. Crucially, θ is
drawn by Mother Nature and it could be high (θ2) or low (θ1); θ2 >θ 1. This information
is known only to the incumbent ﬁrm and union, but not to the entrant until it enters. It
believes that θ2 occurs with probability ρ and θ1 occurs with probability (1 − ρ). Once
drawn θ remains the same over two periods which is our relevant time horizon.
The incumbent ﬁrm sells in both periods and each period’s output is bargained over
(along with the wage). The entrant observes the output (equivalently price) of the ﬁrst
period and may enter in the second period, based on its belief about the incumbent. Entry
requires incurring a ﬁxed cost F and entry is proﬁtable only against θ2. Note that the
2entrant does not interact with the incumbent’s union.1 All strategic ﬁrm interactions are
Cournot. Both the incumbent ﬁrm and its union dislike entry.
Stages of the game involved are as follows.
Period 1
Stage 1: Mother Nature chooses the reservation wage of the workers (θ). (The same
reservation wage prevails in both periods)
Stage 2: Firm 1 and its union bargain over the ﬁrst period w and l.
Stage 3: Production takes place. Firm 2 observes only p, or both p and w and takes
entry decision.
Period 2
Stage 1: If ﬁrm 2 enters it instantly learns the true θ. Firm 1 and union negotiate over
w and l. Cournot duopoly emerges. If ﬁrm 2 does not enter, ﬁrm 1 retains its
monopoly, and output is chosen via bargaining.
Let us ﬁrst consider the symmetric information wage-employment contracts. Under





1−γ = [(w − θ)l]
γ[(A − l − w)l]
1−γ












The employment is given by a vertical contract curve (unaﬀected by the bargaining
powers of the two parties), and the wage is a sum of the base wage θi and a ﬁxed proportion
of surplus.2 The proportion depends on the bargaining power of the union. Since the wage
1That is plausible in many situations: international competition, large diﬀerence is skill requirements
of the incumbent and the entrant, localised trade unions by law or by institutional set up, etc.
2The underlying ﬁrst order conditions are
A − 2l = w −
γ
1−γ(A − l − w)
w = γ(A − l) + (1 − γ)θ.
3and employment belong to the contract curve, the outcome is eﬃcient ( ` a la McDonald and
Solow, 1981). In fact, this eﬃciency remains in tact, even if a proﬁt-sharing arrangement
is introduced into union-ﬁrm contracts (Anderson and Devereux, 1989). In contrast,
under right-to-manage bargaining (Nickell and Andrews, 1983), the outcome is ineﬃcient;
employment is chosen from the labour demand curve instead of the contract curve.




4 and for ﬁrm 1 ΠM
i = (1 − γ)
(A−θi)2
4 .
Under (symmetric information) duopoly, for a given θi the contract curve is given by
li =
A−2θi+c











i = (1 − γ)
(A−2θi+c)2
9 ,
respectively. Clearly, here too the contract remains eﬃcient. Firm 2’s proﬁt is Ri =
(A−2c+θi)2
9 − F, i =1 ,2. Since we have assumed entry to be proﬁtable only against θ2,w e





3 Bargaining under entry threat: The case of unob-
servable wage
We ﬁrst consider the scenario where the entrant does not observe the wage; it observes
only the price and tries to infer the type of the union. Now, if the entrant’s expected
proﬁt upon entry is positive (ER = ρR1 + (1 − ρ)R2 > 0) and the union is of low type,
the incumbent ﬁrm-union pair will try to signal the true type of the union (through price)
in order to deter entry. This is the case of separating equilibrium. Alternatively, if the
entrant’s expected proﬁt upon entry is negative (ER < 0) and the union is of high type,
the incumbent ﬁrm-union pair will try to hide true information. This is the case of pooling
equilibrium. In either case, distortions in employment may occur.
If the entrant’s priors are such that its expected proﬁt is positive, the entrant can
be discouraged only if it can be informed of the truly low type of the union, and this is
4achieved through a separating equilibrium.
Separating equilibrium: Under separating equilibrium the ﬁrm-union pair should
set a suﬃciently low price if θ = θ1, and a high price if θ = θ2. These two prices must





























Condition (2) states that, for θ = θ1 by setting p1 entry is deterred and ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt




2 ) been set and entry occurred. Condition (4) states that for θ =
θ2 by setting p2 = pM
2 (=
A+θ2
2 ) entry is accommodated and thereby ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt becomes
greater than what it would have been had p1 been set and deterred entry. Conditions (3)
and (5) state the same from the union’s point of view for θ1 and θ2 respectively.
Now we note that since wage is not observed by the entrant, it retains its standard rent-
sharing role under eﬃcient bargaining. It implies that both proﬁt and net wage bill will be
proportional to the joint surplus Si =( A−pi)(pi−θi). In particular when p1 is set, we get
wi = γ(A − l1 − θi)+θi and U(p1,w i)=( wi − θi)(A − p1)=γ(p1 − θi)(A − p1)=γSi(p1),
which in turn gives Πi(p1,w i)=( p1−wi)(A−p1) = (1−γ)(p1−θi)(A−p1) = (1−γ)Si(p1).





i = (1 − γ)
(A−θi)2
2 . Similar
relation holds for UD
i and UM
i . Because both parties’ payoﬀs are proportional to the joint
surplus, we can compress four incentive compatibility conditions into two and restate these
in terms of joint surplus. When explicitly written, these constraints become







(A − 2θ1 + c)2
9
], (6)







(A − 2θ2 + c)2
9
]. (7)
Nash bargaining over wi and li must satisfy the constraints (6) and (7), if the resulting
5prices are to reveal true θ. Formally one needs to maximize Z = [(wi−θi)li]γ[(A−wi−li)]1−γ
subject to (6) and (7).
























9 ], i =1 ,2. Clearly, p
1 <p L
1 <p M
1 , assuming ￿1 > ￿2 >
(θ2−θ1)2
4 .3
Therefore, any p1 ∈ [p
1,p L
1] and p2 = pM
2 will satisfy both constraints. See Figure 1 for a
diagrammatic representation. If the union is of low type, price will be distorted downward
to a limit price such as pL
1. This is in line with the well known result of limit pricing
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). We may also specify suitable out-of-equilibrium beliefs that
support the proposed (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Limit pricing
Pooling equilibrium: Alternatively, if ER < 0 entry will not take place, unless the
3Which holds for a wide range of parametric conﬁgurations: ￿1 > ￿2 ⇒ c<2A+7θ1+7θ2













6entrant is able to update its priors and be sure that the incumbent is high cost type.
Therefore, by not signalling the true θ the union-ﬁrm pair can prevent entry and be bet-
ter oﬀ when the true θ is θ2. Formally, the equilibrium price must satisfy the incentive
compatibility conditions of the low type, which is given by condition (6), and the following
condition for the high type







(A − 2θ2 + c)2
9
]. (8)
Note that this is just condition (7) with the inequality now reversed, so that the untruthful
behaviour is preferred. Clearly, the symmetric information monopoly price corresponding
to the low type union, pM
1 , falls in the overlapping range of prices that satisfy both condi-
tions (6) and (8), by construction. Therefore, it is optimal for the ﬁrm-union pair to set
pM
1 regardless of θ = θ1 or θ = θ2.
Proposition 1: When wage is not observed by the entrant, entry threat infuses inef-
ﬁciency into the union-ﬁrm bargaining in the form of over-employment. Under separating
equilibrium the low type is over-employed, and under pooling equilibrium the high type is
over-employed. Along with price, wage is also distorted downwardly.
The ineﬃciency results from the fact that without distorting price the low cost cannot
distinguish itself from the high type, and nor can the high type pretend to be a low type.
This is in line with the standard story of limit pricing; the entry implications are also
standard. The fact that wage and employment are both bargained over helps to base
the incentive constraints on the joint surplus, and this ensures the existence of separating
equilibrium. Pal and Saha (2008) have shown that under right-to-manage bargaining entry
threat can create frictions in rent-sharing and may render signalling impossible.4 Under
4Regardless of the bargaining protocol, limit pricing requires the incumbent ﬁrm to commit to a high
level of employment. However, under right-to-manage bargaining anticipation of such commitment enables
the union to bargain for a very high wage and to shift the cost of signalling largely to the ﬁrm. This
can disrupt the ﬁrm’s incentive constraints and separating equilibrium may not exist. Under eﬃcient
bargaining such hard bargaining by the union is not possible, because wage and employment are determined
7‘eﬃcient bargaining’ that problem is averted, but still the ﬁrm-union pair has only one
instrument of signalling in their disposal: price. This limits their ability to transmit
information, or alternatively makes it easier to suppress information. Therefore, price
distortions are still necessary to reveal information. Consequently ineﬃciency arises.
We should also note that along with price wage is also reduced. Under separating
equilibrium employment and wages are: for θ1, lL
1 =1− pL







1 − θ1)+θ1 <w M
1 ; and for θ2, l2 = lM
2 , w2 = wM
2 . For (l,w) to be eﬃcient,
it must lie on the union-ﬁrm contract curve, li =
A−θi
2 , i =1 ,2. Clearly, that is not





2 and w2 = wM
1 <w M
2 .
3.1 Both wage and price are observable
We now turn to the scenario where both wage and price are observed by the entrant. Since
there are two instruments available, one expects that information revelation will now be
easier, and distortions may not necessarily occur on both dimensions. Alternatively stated,
information suppression may now become diﬃcult, and the scope for pooling equilibrium
may diminish. This will surely beneﬁt the entrant, but may or may not beneﬁt the union-
ﬁrm pair.5
Separating equilibrium: First consider the case of ER > 0. As before wage and
employment must satisfy incentive constraints for both the ﬁrm and the union. But now
as the wage is observable, it is no longer just a rent sharing mechanism. It may need to
be distorted for the purpose of revealing information. Therefore, we cannot focus on the
joint surplus in this case. Individual parties’ incentive constraints are to be considered.
The pair (l1,w 1) will reveal θ = θ1, if the following two conditions are met: (a) Both
the ﬁrm and the θ1 union ﬁnd it proﬁtable to choose (l1,w 1) and deter entry, instead of
simultaneously.
5Side-payments between the union and the ﬁrm are ruled out following other works in the literature Pal
and Saha (2008) and Ishiguro and Shirai (1998). Institutional mechanisms governing industrial relations
and trade union agreements commonly bar such side payments in most countries.
8choosing (lM
1 ,w M
1 ) and induce entry. (b) Either the ﬁrm or the θ2 union, or both must be
worse oﬀ by choosing (l1,w 1) instead of choosing (lM
2 ,w M
2 ).
Note the diﬀerence in the second requirement. For separation of the low type, it is
necessary that the high type does not mimic the low type. If the high type were to mimic
the low type, the entrant must reason that it must be in the interest of both parties;
otherwise one party would veto such a proposal. Suppose, the ﬁrm beneﬁts from such
mimicking, but the union does not; then the only way the ﬁrm can make the union agree
to this is by making a side-payment. But by assumption side-payments are ruled out.
Therefore, the ﬁrm will have no choice but stick to their status quo which is (lM
2 ,w M
2 ) the
symmetric information wage and employment.
In other words, we are invoking an ‘intuitive rule’ that the entrant will apply in its
reasoning about the bargaining. Unless both parties stand to gain, no deviation from
the symmetric information contract will be agreed upon. Taking the symmetric informa-
tion contract as a status quo and enforcing in the case of a disagreement is to avoid any
bargaining impasse. The following assumptions make it clear.
Assumption 1: If any wage and/or employment are distorted from their symmetric
information level, it must be agreed upon both parties.
Assumption 2: When a proposed distortion does not beneﬁt both parties, the sym-
metric information wage and employment will be agreed upon.
Formally, the incentive compatibility conditions of the ﬁrm and the union are given by
(9) and (10) respectively, if the union is θ1 type; and by (11) and (12) respectively, if the
union is θ2 type.




(A − 2θ1 + c)2
9
] (9)




(A − 2θ1 + c)2
9
] (10)




(A − 2θ2 + c)2
9
] (11)




(A − 2θ2 + c)2
9
] (12)
The separating equilibrium pair (l1,w 1) solves the following problem:




1 = [(w1 − θ1)l1]γ[(A − l1 − w1)l1]1−γ
subject to the constraints
(9) and (10) and [(11) or (12) or both].
Now, note that (9) and (11) cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously. Moreover, any (w1,l 1)
that satisﬁes (9), also satisﬁes (11) if the inequality sign is reversed in the latter. That
means, any wage employment pair that is incentive compatible for ‘the ﬁrm facing a θ1
union’ to signal the true state will also allow ‘the ﬁrm facing a θ2 union’ to mimic ‘the ﬁrm
facing a θ1 union’. But by Assumption 1 ‘the ﬁrm facing a θ2 union’ will not be able to
set (w1,l 1) unless the θ2 union also wants to mimic the θ1 union. Therefore, for separating
equilibrium to work we need to ensure that the θ2 union does not ﬁnd optimal to mimic
the θ1 union; in other words, constraint (12) are to be satisﬁed along with (9) and (10).
Consider Figure 2 for a graphical illustration. Any (l1,w 1) pair that lies above the
indiﬀerence curve ¯ u1¯ u1 of the θ1 union and below the indiﬀerence curve ¯ u2¯ u2 of the θ2
union satisﬁes both (10) and (12). Here ¯ u1¯ u1 corresponds to a net wage bill (for θ1 union):




9 ]=¯ u1; and ¯ u2¯ u2 corresponds to a net wage bill




9 ]=¯ u2. Since ¯ u2¯ u2 is ﬂatter than
¯ u1¯ u1 on the (l,w) plane, the set of (w,l) satisfying (10) and (12) is non-empty. Moreover,
the point of intersection B of these two indiﬀerence curves corresponds to a lower level of
employment than point D which occurs at the intersection of ¯ u1¯ u1 and the iso-proﬁt curve
of the ‘ﬁrm facing a θ1 union’ denoted as ¯ Π1¯ Π1. This iso-proﬁt curve maps all (w,l) that
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Figure 2: Observable wage
Hence in Figure 2 any (l1,w 1) belonging to the region BKED can credibly signal that
the union is θ1 type. Now it can be checked that the contract curve involving the ﬁrm
and the θ1 union, which is l =
A−θ1
2 , runs through the region BKED and point B always
lies to the left of it (see Appendix 2 for proof). Therefore, it immediately follows that
symmetric information employment will truthfully reveal the union type. In other words,
employment will remain eﬃcient.
But what about the wage? Clearly, for the separating equilibrium to work, wage must
lie between point K￿ and K. Let us denote the wage at point K by wL
1. As long as
wM
1 <w L
1 the symmetric information wage is also not distorted. It can be shown that
that is indeed the case as long as the union’s bargaining power is below a critical level,
say ˆ γ (see Appendix 3 for proof).6 But if γ>ˆ γ, w1 needs to be restricted to wL
1 for all
6wL








11γ ≥ ˆ γ. Thus the separating equilibrium employment-wage pairs are (lM
1 ,w M
1 ) for γ<ˆ γ,
and (lM
1 ,w L
1) for γ ≥ ˆ γ. For θ2 union the wage-employment choice is (wM
2 ,l M
2 ). Since these
points belong to the respective type’s contract curve, we can argue that under separating
equilibrium eﬃciency is preserved, though the low type union takes a wage cut if γ>ˆ γ.
Pooling equilibrium: If the entrant’s prior beliefs are such that its expected proﬁt
is negative (ER < 0), the possibility of pooling equilibrium emerges. Here, the θ2 type
union would like to mimic a θ1 type union; but in order to do so the ﬁrm and the union
both must agree. That is, both must ﬁnd it proﬁtable to set (wM
1 ,l M
1 ) and deter entry,
instead of sticking to the (status quo) (lM
2 ,w M
2 ) and induce entry. Therefore, the incentive
compatibility conditions (11) and (12) must both be reversed, as given by the following.




(A − 2θ2 + c)2
9
] (11a)




(A − 2θ2 + c)2
9
] (12a)
Other incentive compatibility conditions remain unchanged. For θ2 union the problem is
to solve the following problem.




2 = [(w1 − θ2)l1]γ[(A − l1 − w1)l1]1−γ
subject to the constraints
(9), (10), (11a) and (12a).
By a similar argument made in the case of separating equilibrium it can be shown that
(lM
1 ,w M
1 ) always satisﬁes (9), (10) and (11a), but not (12a) if γ ≤ ˆ γ. This implies that a
deviation from (wM
2 ,l M
2 ) to (wM
1 ,l M
1 ) will not be agreed upon by both the ﬁrm and the θ2
union, and therefore, by Assumption 2 the status quo (wM
2 ,l M
2 ) remains. In other words
there is no pooling equilibrium, if γ ≤ ˆ γ.
But if γ>ˆ γ,( lM
1 ,w M
1 ) satisﬁes all four constraints ((9), (10), (11a) and (12a)). That
means both the the ﬁrm and the θ2 union will agree to setting (lM
1 ,w M
1 ) instead of (wM
2 ,l M
2 ).















12the union is suﬃciently powerful. The strength of the union matters because a strong
union has much more to gain from preventing entry (by suppressing information), while
its bargaining partner, a weak ﬁrm, does not have much proﬁt to protect; nevertheless it is
also better oﬀ by preserving its market power. Hence, the pooling equilibrium emerges. Of
course with it over-employment will occur for θ2 union. We can here also suitably specify
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the entrant to support the proposed equilibrium.
Proposition 2: When the entrant observes both price and wage, entry threat does
not cause ineﬃciency to the bargaining outcome if the union’s bargaining power is below a
critical level (ˆ γ), although the θ1 union may accept a reduction in wage. Pooling equilibrium
does not exist and the separating equilibrium does not involve any limit pricing. But if the
union’s bargaining power exceeds ˆ γ and the entrant’s priors are such that its expected proﬁt
is negative (ER < 0), then a pooling equilibrium emerges in which the θ2 union is over-
employed.
Comparing Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 we can say that the possibility of ineﬃ-
cient outcomes is much less when wage is also observable to the entrant. The intuition is
that with an additional information carrier (namely the wage) information suppression is
more diﬃcult, or equivalently information revelation becomes easier. Consequently, pool-
ing equilibrium may not exist at all. Above all, the separating equilibrium employment
is not distorted from the symmetric information levels. Only when the union is powerful,
information suppression becomes optimal for both parties, and some ineﬃciency emerges.
In a nutshell, the availability of an additional signalling device makes information revela-
tion much easier, and thus mitigates to a great extent the ineﬃciency problem caused by
asymmetric information.
134 Concluding remarks
Our analysis suggests that for the purpose of improving eﬃciency it is not suﬃcient to
induce the ﬁrms and unions to bargain over both wage and employment by some insti-
tutional mechanism, or to introduce an element of proﬁt sharing in the payment system
when bargaining takes place only over wage. When there are entry threats the ﬁrms may
be required to disclose wage agreements (and similar agreements with other input suppli-
ers). Though this will not directly give away the incumbent’s private cost information,
it will certainly improve the entrant’s ability to process information, and yet at the same
time will save the incumbents from taking costly signalling measures. The society will
also be better oﬀ by encouraging right level of entry. To what extent this can be done in
reality remains an open issue, as it has bearing on both industrial relations regulation and
anti-trust policies.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: The point B always lies to the left of point D as shown in Figure 2
Proof: We have, ∂w
∂l |¯ u1¯ u1= −w1−θ1
l1 < −w1−θ2
l1 = ∂w
∂l |¯ u2¯ u2. That is, the union’s indiﬀerence curve
¯ u1¯ u1 is steeper than ¯ u2¯ u2 in the l − w plane. Therefore, these two indiﬀerence curves intersect
only once.
Now, it is suﬃcient to prove that the level of employment corresponding to point B (lB
1 ) is




Now solving the equations of ¯ u1¯ u1 and ¯ u2¯ u2, we get lB
1 = ¯ u1−¯ u2










Again solving the equations of ¯ u1¯ u1 and ¯ Π1¯ Π1, we get l1 = 1
2[A−θ1±
￿
(A − θ1)2 − 4
γ ¯ u1]. We
discard the root 1
2[A − θ1 −
￿
(A − θ1)2 − 4
γ ¯ u1], since it corresponds to the point of intersection
of ¯ u1¯ u1 and ¯ Π1¯ Π1 that is closer to the w-axis. Hence, lD
1 = 1
2[A − θ1 +
￿











[A − θ1 +
￿




⇒ γ[(1 − δ)





(A − θ1 − θ2 + c) <
1
2
[A − θ1 +
￿
δ(A − θ1)2 −
4δ
9
(A − 2θ1 + c)2],
15which is obvious for γ = 0. Since the LHS is increasing in γ and the RHS doesnot depend on
γ, it is suﬃcient to show that the above inequality is true for γ = 1. Now, if γ = 1, the above
inequality implies that














(A − 2θ1 + c)2
9
},
which is obvious, since 2A−θ1−θ2
4 < A−θ1
2 ⇒ θ1 <θ 2 and c<2A+7θ1+7θ2
16 (by construction). QED
Appendix 2: The point B always lies to the left of the contract curve of the low
state: l = A−θ1
2























which is obvious for γ = 0. If the above is true for γ = 1, then it is true ∀γ.











[2A +7 θ1 +7 θ2 − 16c],
which is true since θ2 >θ 1 and c<2A+7θ1+7θ2
16 (by construction). QED




1 is given by the solution of (w1−θ2)l1 =¯ u2 and l1 = A−θ1























(A − 2θ2 + c)2
9
















say. Therefore, if γ>ˆ γ, wM
1 >w L
1 . QED
16